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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS: 
A POLICY ANALYSIS1 
By 
Elizabeth Steiner Maccia 
1. Introduction 
1. My position in this paper is not one of advocacy but one of analysis. 
There is no need for a philosopher to reinforce the voices of women. Nor 
am I here in a position of the compleat analyst. There is no need for a 
philosopher to reinforce the voices of scientists and other non-philosophic 
analysts. I am here as one whose intellectual loyalty is to the pursuit of 
logical and moral illumination. 
2. In the pursuit of logical illumination, I shall attempt to explicate 
policy, policy analysis, and affirmative action plans. In the pursuit of 
moral illumination, I shall discuss the policy of affirmative action relative 
to the kind of society in which we want to live and the kind of men and 
women we wish to see nurtured in such a society. 
2. The Nature of Policy* 
1. Social organizations emerge wherever there are groups of persons. 
Some of them are informal and some are formal. Formal social organizations 
are instituted to achieve certain goals. An example of a non-institution 
would be the family; of an institution, the university. Whether a social 
organization is formal or informal, it is characterized by structure, i.e., 
*In clarifying my ideas about policy and policy analysis, of help were 
the following: S. Ballinger, "The Nature and Function of Educational Policy" 
Cl); H.S. Bhola, "The Design of (Educational) Policy: Directing and Harnessing 
Social Power for Social Outcomes" (2); A.S. Clayton, "The Organization of the 
School of Education, Indiana University for Policy Development" (3) and "The 
Relevance of Philosophy of Education to Questions of Educational Policy" (4); 
and P.G. Smith, "On Policy" (16). 
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a "specific relational system of interaction among individuals and collectiv-
ities" (9), and by culture, i.e., "transmitted and created content and patterns 
of values, ideas, and other symbolic-meaningful systems" (9). Structure gives 
rise to positioning of individuals and collectivities in the group and so to 
status, while culture—the shared beliefs and orientations—provides guides 
for the conduct of members in the group and so gives rise to role. Status 
and role, of course, are not independent of one another, for structure and 
culture interact. For instance, an authoritative role leads to a superordi-
nate position, and a superordinate position to an authoritative role. Hence, 
the official capacity to exercise control depends upon both structure and 
culture. The powerful and produced by culture and are producers of culture. 
2. Since institutions are to achieve certain goals, they can by defined 
by the constitutive rules for acts taken to embody such achievement. For 
instance, just as chess is constituted by the rules which are essential for 
one? player either capturing or checking another player's king, so a university 
is constituted by the rules which are essential for the promotion of learning. 
The constitutive rules of an institution, therefore, prescribe its structure 
and culture. Such rules create offices and roles, regulate procedures, and 
assign rights and duties. 
3. "Rule," according to Black* (3), has four main senses: instruction, 
regulation, precept, and principle. A rule as an instruction is a direction, 
and so expresses a command whose form is S do A where 1Sf stands for a sub-
ject and 'A' for an action. There is no modality in the sense of the action 
being required, forbidden, or permitted. A rule as regulation is lawlike, 
and so expresses a prescription whose form is S to do A. The 'to do' adds 
the modal element. A rule as precept is a rule of prudence or of morality, 
and so expresses a normative whose form is S ought to do A. 
*It should be noted that my exposition of the four senses of "Rule" 
deviates from that of Black. 
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Even though both the regulation and the precept involve a prescription, in 
the case of the precept neither is there a sense of enforcing, rescinding, or 
reinstating the rule nor does the rule have a history. Finally, a rule as 
principle is a covering rule for either instructions or regulations or 
precepts. The fourth sense of rule, therefore, is a sense of rule that is 
a more general sense relative to one of the other three senses. It is patent 
that constitutive rules which define institutions are regulations not instruc-
tions; constitutive rules are instituted, and so have authorship and law-
likeness. Whether constitutive rules are also precepts depends upon whether 
institutions have intrinsic and instrumental worth. A good and effective 
constitutive rule is more than a regulation; it is also a precept. 
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4. Institutions, of course, can be further organized. That is to say, 
social organizations can arise in which institutions are the collectivities 
that are related within a context of shared beliefs. Such supra-institutions 
also are defined through constitutive rules. Government is an obvious 
example of a supra-institution. Those institutions taken to be in the public 
sector are the collectivities related in government. 
5. Although 'policy' relates to the term 'political' and thereby brings 
to mind governmental constitutive rules, I shall use 'policy' in a wider 
sense than public policy. I shall use 'policy' also for the constitutive 
rules of other societal institutions whether they be supra-institutions or 
not. The justification of so using 'policy' is lack of logical difference 
between constitutive rules of government and other societal institutions. 
Contemporary usage of 'policy' as in 'educational policy' and 'Marietta 
College's Faculty Hiring Policy', and ancient usage of 'polis', the Greek 
etymon of 'policy' which extended affairs of state beyond the governmental, 
also do not restrict one's use to public policy. 
6. Schema 1 presents a partial summary of this section of the paper 
on the nature of policy. The relation between the kinds of rules and the 
kinds of policy is presented. 
3. Policy Analysis 
1. Policy can be analyzed from many perspectives. The analysis in 
section 2 above was a logical one. The nature of policy was presented 
through a discussion of its order, i.e., its form, content, and function. 
It was found that policy is the regulations that define an institution by 
prescribing its structure and culture. This, of course, is a general analysis 
of policy.* One also could specify the form, content, and function of 
different institutions' policies. In the course of such specification, 
policy that is implicit would be made explicit. If comparisons were made 
between policies, then comparative as well as descriptive analysis would 
take place. Not only would institutions be described, but they would also 
be compared. __ 
DIRECTIONS 
(S do A) 
RULE: 
REGULATIONS 




(S ought to do 
POLICIES 
Schema 1: Kinds of Rules Related to Kinds of Policy 
*To be more precise, a logical analysis is a meta-analysis. 
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2. Since policy is instituted, policy is formulated (not always 
explicitly) and sometimes implemented (not all policy is operative). There 
are many aspects of policy formulation and implementation to be analyzed by 
the behavioral scientist. One aspect of interest to psychologists and 
sociologists is conflict within the process. Different persons and collectiv-
ities within an institution can disagree. Moreover, institutions within 
institutions can. Obviously the decision-making aspect of the instituting 
of policy is of interest to the political scientist. Power distribution 
and execution are there to be analyzed.* 
3. Besides logical, descriptive, comparative, and behavioral scientific 
analysis of policy, there is normative analysis of policy. This kind of 
analysis consits in determining whether the constitutive rules defining an 
institution are more than regulations. As stated in 2.3, regulations also 
m y be precepts. Because precepts may be either rules of morality or rules 
of prudence, both philosophical and praxiological analyses are required. 
Philosophical analysis directs itself to questions of morality relative to 
policy. Questions as to the justness of an institution which are questions 
as to the justness of its policy are such questions. On the other hand, 
praxiological analysis** directs itself to questions of prudence relative to 
policy. Questions as to the effectiveness of institutional regulations to 
bring about institutional ends are such questions. 
4. The historical perspective is yet another one from which to analyze 
policy. Institutions do have histories, and so one can attempt to explain 
changes in their constitutive rules. 
*A perspective that permits unification of psychological, sociological 
and political analyses of institutions is general systems theory. See E.S. 
Maccia and G.S. Maccia, "Use of SIGGS Theory Model to Characterize Educational 
Systems as Social Systems." (10) 
**Praxiology is the science of practices, i.e., of means-ends relation-
ship. See James E. Perry's dissertation, On the Significance of Praxiology 
for the Study of Education for a more comprehensive account of praxiology (12). 
6 
5. The final type of policy analysis to be distinguished is more than 
analysis. It is analysis directed toward the development of policy. As 
stated by Y. Dror who has delineated developmental policy analysis: 
One weakness of the term "analysis" is Its calculative-logical 
connotation. In policy analysis a very important part of the 
job is to invent new alternatives and to engage in creative and 
Imaginative thinking. Nevertheless, I prefer a concept which 
somewhat understates the role rather than too presumptuous, 
too "political," and too frightening a term, such as "policy 
adviser" or "policy consultant," (6) 
Such developmental analysis can be framed within the systems analytic paradigm 
provided the paradigm is extended beyond its usual quantitative limits and 
it incorporates the political phenomenon of decision-making. (6,11) 
6. Schema 2 summarizes the above discussion of policy analysis. The 
types of policy analysis are set forth in the diagram. 
Logical Analysis of Affirmative Action Plans 
1. Executive Order 11246 is directed toward all universities and colleges 
with Federal contracts or subcontracts and requires of them compliance with 
that order. Consequently, Higher Education Guidelines—Executive Order 11246 
is a written public policy. It consists of regulations which are principles 
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to be specified further by those universities and colleges that fall within 
the Federal domain due to their Federal contracts or subcontracts. 
2. The function of Executive Order 11246 can be explicated through 
consideration of its two central concepts: non-discrimination and affirma-
tive action. Non-discrimination requires that "no person may be denied 
employment or related benefits on grounds of his or her race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin." (7) Affirmative action, as the phrase indicates, 
requires more than a passive stance of non-discrimination; it requires deeds 
that rectify inequality of opportunity due to discrimination. Employment 
for groups that traditionally have been discriminated against in higher 
education, i.e., employment for women and minorities, is called for. "Minorities 
are defined by the Department of Labor as Negroes, Spanish-surnamed, American 
Indians, and Orientals." (7) As part of its affirmative action requirement, 
a contractor university or college must "determine whether women and 
minorities are "underutilized" in its employee work force and, if that is 
the case, to develop as part of its affirmative action program specific goals 
and timetables designed to overcome that underutilization.T (7) 
3. In order to specify the public policy of non-discrimination and 
affirmative action, the universities and colleges falling under Executive 
Order 1124 6 must set forth a plan which contains more than a statement of 
commitment to equal employment opportunity and a statement of goals and when 
they are to be realized. The commitment to equal employment opportunity must 
be detailed through personnel policies, e.g., policies of recruitment, hiring, 
assignment, training, promotion, anti-nepotism, etc. The goals and time-
tables must be supported through data on the respective university's or 
college's work force and on the availability of women and minorities for that 
work force. Not only must affirmative action be planned to increase numbers 
of women and minorities in the work force, but also to rectify any discrimi-
nation within the work force, e.g., discrimination as reflected in salaries. 
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To ensure that policies will not remain inoperative, plans must include 
evaluative mechanisms as well as disseminative ones. 
4. Before turning to an analysis of the moral legitimacy of affirmative 
action plans, it should be pointed out that, even though it be granted that 
goals are quotas, public policy does not demand hiring of non-qualified 
personnel by institutions of higher learning. J. Stanley Pottinger, former 
Director of the Office of Civil Rights, argued that goals were not quotas. 
Quotas, on the one hand, imply a numerical level of employment 
that must be met. If quotas were required, they would be rigid 
requirements, and their effects would be to compel employment de-
cisions to fulfill them, regardless of the compromising effect 
fulfillment might have on legitimate qualifications and standards, 
regardless of the good faith effort made to fulfill them, and 
regardless of the fact that quotas might have been set by arbitrary 
standards unrelated to the availability of capable applicants and 
the potential of the contractor to recruit them. 
Goals, on the other hand, signify a different concept and a 
different employment process. They are projected levels of 
achievement resulting from an analysis by a contractor of his 
deficiencies, and of what he believes he can do about them. 
Establishing goals signifies both that the contractor has made 
such an analysis, and that he has committed himself to good 
faith to meet them. (13) 
Sidney Hook, however, argues that goals are quotas. 
What is the logical or cognitive difference between saying 
(1) "You are to aim at a quota of 20% redheads for your staff 
within two years," and (2) "You are to set as your goal re= 
cruitment of 20% redheads for your staff within two years?" 
Quotas are numerical goals. A "quota of 20%" is equivalent to 
"a numerical goal of 20%." The expressions are interchangeable. 
The cognitive meaning of neither sentence is altered if we sub-
stitute one expression for the other. (8) 
He goes on to place his argument in the context of remarks such as Pottinger's. 
Spokesmen of HEW seek to absolve themselves of the guilt of 
seeking to impose a quota system by insisting on a distinction 
that makes no difference in fact or practice. "We don't de-
mand," they plead, "that the numerical goals we set down 
actually be achieved. We ask only that a good faith effort 
be made to achieve it." How does this differ from saying, 
"We don't demand that the quotas actually be filled or 
reached, only that you honestly try?" (8) 
Stated this way, goals and quotas do not differ. But there is a difference 
between demanding compliance and calling for an honest try. 
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To call for an honest try is to give the necessary leeway for not hiring 
women and minorities who are not capable of functioning in a university, i.e., 
functioning to promote learning. While it might be, as Hook states it, 
"natural.. .to reduce standards in order to establish good faith in the quest 
for numerical goals or quotas" (8), it is not demanded by public policy. 
Even its naturalness or what happens in practice is open to question. An 
answer depends upon praxiological, behavioral scientific, and descriptive 
analyses of affirmative action plans. 'Perhaps the Indian experience in 
using quotas to achieve social justice can shed sane light upon the matter. 
Paul Seabury asserts that this experience shows that quotas and preferences 
lead to extremes of absurdity. Some absurdities noted by him are: 
So-called "backward classes" proliferated to the point where 
it became necessary to be designated as "backward" in order 
to become privileged. And, indeed, in 1964, a "Backwardness 
Commission" recommended in the state of Mysore that every 
group except two (the Brahmins and the Lingayats) be officially 
designated as backward! (15) 
In Kanpur, recently, the son of a wealthy Jat family applied 
for admission to the Indian Institute of Technology and was 
rejected on objective criteria; then he reapplied as a member 
of an ethnically-scheduled caste, and on this basis was admitted. (15) 
5. Philosophical Analysis of Affirmative Action Plans 
1. All would admit that we want to live in a just society. But all do 
not agree as to what a just society is. Some would hold utilitarianism and 
take the just society to be one in which its institutions maximize the net 
balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to the 
group. But surely each individual has an inviolability that cannot be over-
ridden by the welfare of the group. Also some would hold that all individuals 
should be treated equally. But surely there are differences in individuals. 
By accepting a Kantian position on justice, such as Rawls' (14), both in-
violability and differences need not be set aside and communality is possible. 
2. Kant's categorical imperative stated as the principle of universality: 
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Act only on the maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law 
sets forth that subjective choosing ought to be objective. Thus, this 
principle is a normalcy one for rational beings. It is a requirement for 
being rational. The stating of the categorical imperative as the principle 
of autonomy: 
So act that the will could at the same time regard itself as 
giving in its maxims universal laws 
makes clear that subjective choosing which is objective is also a will con-
ditioning itself or a good will. Thus, this principle establishes liberty. 
It is a requirement for freedom. Finally, the stating of the categorical 
imperative as the principle of humanity: 
So act that in your own person as well as in the person of every 
other you are treating mankind also as an end, never merely as 
a means 
makes subjective choosing which is objective respect for the self. Thus, 
this principle establishes inviolability. It is a requirement for communality. 
All together these principles are the categorical imperative which is the 
basis for rational conference and agreement, i.e., for fairness. 
3. Rawls sets forth two principles of social justice that he takes to 
be chosen by human beings who are rational. 
First: each person is to have equal right to the most extensive 
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's 
advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. (14) 
Rawls restates the second principle to clarify that a difference principle 
operates as well as a principle of equality of opportunity: 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advan-
taged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (14) 
These two principles set forth the policy for society's assignment of rights 
and duties and for the distribution of social and economic advantages. 
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This policy is not simply regulative but is also moral precept. Consequently, 
Rawls' two principles are a basis for philosophical analysis of policy. 
4. Since affirmative action plans specify policy about the distribution 
of social and economic advantages, philosophical analysis will be in terms 
of rawls' second principle. This principle is not one of redress in the 
sense of requiring society to try to compensate for inequalities so that 
everyone on a fair basis could compete with everyone else. However, the 
second principle does demand recognition that the advantaged are not to gain 
because of their native assets or social circumstances but because of bene-
fiting the disadvantaged. The advantaged are not deserving of greater social 
and economic rewards than the disadvantaged, inequalities of birth or 
station are not merited. Hence, no one should gain or lose from one's 
arbitrary place in the distribution of natural assets or social circumstances 
without gaining or receiving compensatory advantages in return. In other words, 
the second principle is an agreement to share in the benefits of the distri-
bution of natural talents whatever it might be. Rationality, therefore, is 
non-supportive of either a meritocracy or a technocracy. These are unjust 
social arrangements. Still, the second principle does not perpetuate the 
status quo. Earlier generations owe to later generations the implementation 
of policies, including eugenic ones, which will, if it can be done, move the 
society toward equal talent. 
5. Patently, the affirmative action plans constitute policy that is 
moral as well as regulative. The second principle of justice is embodied in 
the two basic concepts of affirmative action plans, non-discrimination and 
affirmative action. Non-discrimination relates to the principle of equal 
opportunity, while affirmative action relates to the principle of difference. 
By not discriminating on the basis of characteristics non-qualifying for pro-
moting learning, equal opportunity for employment within universities and 
colleges is possible. 
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By actually hiring women and minorities qualified to promote learning, talents 
formerly unavailable result in benefit for all. 
6. Sidney Hook has called affirmative action plans immoral on the 
grounds that the affirmative action part of the plans is discriminatory. 
For some purposes—trade, immigration policy, rationing of 
scarce commodities, etc.— a quota system may be legitimate. 
But when we are seeking the best qualified person or persons' 
for a position it is never morally legitimate, particularly 
when we are on record as being opposed in principle to dis-
crimination on grounds of race, religion, sex or national 
origin except when these are justifiably among the qualifi-
cations, e.g., sex for certain kinds of dancers or officers 
for women's detention centers, religion for service in house 
worship, etc. (8) 
Obviously, Hook is mistaken. Affirmative action does not make sex or race or 
national origin qualifications for promoting learning. Women and minorities 
are scheduled to be hired to demonstrate that being a non-minority and male 
are not qualifications. But what if qualified non-minority men are not 
hired? For example, the Female and Minority Program at the University of 
Minnesota was discontinued due to complaints of reverse discrimination which 
were made to the state human rights commission. The F & M Program opened 
higher paying administrative and professional jobs first to women and min-
orities. In one year and a half, 133 F 8 M jobs were filled, and only 43 
of them finally by white males. (17) Again the problem is not with affirmative 
action. Rather the problem is one of allocating resources to hire non-
minority men as well as women and minorities. 
7. Given the budgetary crunch in higher education, firing not hiring, 
whether it be affirmative action hiring or not, faces us. If a society 
cannot give opportunity to its members, then that society must be reordered 
for justice's sake. Public policy relative to resource reallocation is 
required. Resources must be reallocated from that which is destructive of 
human spirit to that which is not. Only in the context of such public 
policy can affirmative action plans further the just society. 
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